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Abstract 
The aim of this Special Issue is to advance our understanding of performance-based 
contracting (PBC) in business markets. PBC has the potential for aligning incentives among 
buyers and sellers and fostering innovation. This paper critically reflects on extant research 
developments in order to develop a systematic knowledge map of PBC research. On that 
basis four major research gaps are identified and addressed, drawing out specific avenues for 
further PBC research. The knowledge map is also used to illustrate the focus and main 
arguments of the articles featuring in this Special Issue.  
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1. Introduction 
Existing literature reviews on performance-based contracting (PBC) have shown a 
dramatic increase of scientific contributions being published in that area over the last decade 
(e.g. Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015; Hypko et al., 2010). Recent studies published in 
Industrial Marketing Management (IMM) have highlighted the increasing importance of 
´servitization´, an adjacent topic to PBC, with particular emphasis on the academic discourse 
of service offerings, service pricing, and contracting for services (e.g. Brax and Visintin, 
2016; Kowalkowski, et al., 2015; Ulaga and Loveland, 2014; Roehrich and Caldwell, 2012). 
This Special Issue (SI) builds on these contributions and addresses explicitly the contractual 
aspects of servitization and the role of PBC more specifically. The purpose of this article is 
not only to provide an overview of the SI papers, but also to frame the topic and to suggest 
directions for future research on PBC on the basis of remaining knowledge gaps.  
A focus on PBC is needed due to the increasing stream of research on service 
business development (servitization) across many industries and the use of numerous 
synonymous terms to describe the PBC phenomenon such as ´performance (-based) 
contracting´, ´performance-based logistics´, ´outcome-based contracting´, ´availability 
contracting´, ´pay for performance´, and ´performance-based service acquisition´. Thus, it is 
not surprising that multiple definitions of PBC exist in the literature stressing aspects such as 
definition of performance in terms of outputs and outcomes, the design of incentive payment 
systems, financial risks and risk transfer to suppliers, and asset ownership issues (e.g. 
Brucker and Stewart, 2011; Hypko et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2010). 
As PBC links service or integrated solution providers with their industrial customers, 
it is also of importance for the academic discussion and theory development in industrial 
marketing (IM) and its ‘counterpart’ in operations and supply management (OSM). PBC is a 
promising contractual mode which enables business partners to adopt ´use rather than own´ 
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strategies. Thus, PBC can be seen as an approach that represents a supply chain application of 
the service-dominant-logic theory (Randall et al. 2010). PBC is also of high relevance to 
practice, as (complex) service offerings are increasingly important to the world-wide 
economy. This can be illustrated with recent service offerings of space freight transport (e.g. 
Space X company), pay per use of aero engines (e.g. the often cited Rolls Royce aero engine 
support-case), full service offerings for machinery and equipment (cp. the discussion of 
outsourced manufacturing), or full service fleet and mobility management (helicopter to 
forklift trucks) (a.o. Randall et al., 2014; Kleemann, 2013;, Seedhouse, 2013). These 
examples compare with the B2C market and examples such as Uber (mobility), AirBnB 
(lodging), Dim Dom (toys), GirlMeetsDress (clothes), movies (Netflix), parking spaces 
(parkatmyhouse), land (Shared Earth) and many other companies and offerings using a 
´use/access rather than own´ strategy (Earley, 2016). It seems necessary to have a closer look 
at relevant contractual arrangements to analyze the impact of that strategy in the industrial 
and manufacturing context (Malhotra and Van Alstyne, 2014).  
Existing research appears to converge on some common denominators and 
collectively defines PBC as a contracting approach whereby payment to the provider 
(supplier) is tied either partially or fully to its performance (Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015). 
However, the literature is less in agreement about what constitutes ‘performance’ with some 
studies suggesting that performance includes both service outputs and outcomes (e.g. Martin, 
2007; Axelsson and Wynstra, 2002), while others referring only to outcomes (e.g. Ng et al., 
2013). The majority of the literature in fact fails to explicitly define clearly ‘outputs’ and 
‘outcomes’ and comments on their differences (for a notable exception see Martin, 2007). In 
this introductory article, PBC is defined as a contract which provides incentives for business 
outcomes. This means that a service provider is compensated according to the contribution 
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made to the business results of the service buyer and pricing depends (at least to a certain 
extend) on the service performance level that is actually rendered (Figure 1). 
 
Fig. 1. A definition of PBC  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The upcoming Section 2 discuss 
extant literature on adjacent areas of system selling, integrated solutions, and procuring 
complex performance, before positioning PBC research in IM and OSM. The section 
cumulates in proposing a PBC framework. Next, the papers of the SI and the existing PBC 
literature are mapped according to the framework, which also leads to the identification of 
remaining research gaps. These findings are briefly discussed and specific suggestions for 
future research avenues are provided in the subsequent conclusion section. 
 
2. Performance-based contracting research: State of the art  
This section reviews the state of the art of PBC research. We first discuss the 
relevance of PBC to the wider IM and OSM literatures, addressing adjacent concepts such as 
solutions and systems selling, product-service systems and procuring complex performance 
(PCP). Key studies which explicitly focus on PBC within these adjacent areas are 
highlighted. Finally, we provide a brief account of the current status of extant PBC literature 
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across disciplines and propose an overarching framework of PBC research to further drive 
systematic research efforts to inform academics and practitioners alike. 
 
2.1. PBC relevance to industrial marketing and purchasing 
‘System selling’ or ‘systems marketing’ as pioneered by the industrial marketing 
literature and dating back to the 1960s (Mattson, 1973) form the roots of solutions provision. 
System selling is defined as the provision of products and services as integrated systems that 
provide solutions to client’s operational needs (Page and Siemplenski, 1983). Later, industrial 
marketing management research heralded the move from ‘system selling’ to ‘solution 
selling’. Solution selling encompasses the complete activity chain for a client, creating a new 
role for the seller to become a ‘strategic consultant’ able to foster the client’s value creation 
processes (Cova and Salle, 2007). Whereas systems selling strategies focus on answering the 
client’s operational needs (Azimont et al., 1998), solution selling strategies develop the 
client’s core business. The industrial marketing literature identifies two contrasting pure 
forms of solutions providers: systems sellers and systems integrators. Systems sellers are 
vertically integrated organizations producing all (or most) components in-house or in 
collaboration with a group of firms. Systems integrators are responsible for integrating goods 
and services supplied by multiple vendors and service providers (Davies, 2004; Prencipe et 
al., 2003).  
Extant literature in IM and OSM literatures and adjacent areas offer a myriad of labels 
describing solution offerings as ‘integrated solutions’ (Davies et al., 2006), ‘customer-centric 
business solutions’ (Galbraith, 2002), ‘product service systems’ (Pawar et al., 2009), and 
‘customer solutions’ (Sawhney et al., 2004). Following Tuli et al. (2007), these labels consist 
of three common key characteristics: (i) a solution involves a combination of goods and 
services, (ii) which are customized to address particular client’s requirements, (iii) and 
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products and services – and the related tasks - in a solution must be integrated to work 
together. These labels characterize the ‘service-dominant logic’ (Vargo and Lusch, 2004) and 
the move towards ‘servitization’ (Vandermerwe and Rada, 1988) for organizations from 
different sectors. Beyond contract-oriented theories, the service dominant logic (SDL) of 
Marketing is a key perspective employed to study PBC. It mainly stresses the role of 
relational governance mechanisms such as trust, collaboration, open communications and 
information sharing to manage the co-production of service outcomes between the buyer, 
supplier and other supply chain partners (e.g. Ng et al., 2009). As y mentioned earlier, PBC 
can be seen as the approach that represents a supply chain application of service-dominant-
logic theory (Randall et al., 2010). 
The shift towards integrated solutions mainly started with manufacturing firms 
seeking to expand their revenue income and then it appeared in sectors focused on delivering 
complex products and systems, so called CoPS (Hobday, 2000). For instance, the aero-engine 
manufacturer Rolls Royce offers not only aircraft engines to its customers, but also earns 
revenues from providing ‘total care’ solutions through ’power by the hour’, offering services 
throughout an engine’s lifecycle to ensure that customers pay for a product in use. Extant 
research regarding solution provision has investigated this concept from the perspective of 
either the supplier (Galbraith, 2002), the buyer (Kapletia and Probert, 2009), or the evolving 
inter-organizational relationship between supplier and buyer. Studies adopting the latter 
perspective have tended to focus on value co-creation from a consumer goods (Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy, 2004) and manufacturing industries perspectives (Payne et al., 2008). Value for 
both, provider and customer, is created by enhancing operating efficiency, enabling market 
expansion, and mitigating risks throughout the asset’s lifecycle (Cornet et al., 2000).  
Lewis and Roehrich (2009) argue that although there is an increasing number of 
studies exploring this transition towards servitization and integrated solutions, the majority 
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focuses on challenges faced by the provider. Hence, fewer studies focused on challenges 
associated with this transition from the buyer’s side to explore issues around ‘procuring 
complex performance’ (PCP) (Caldwell and Howard, 2010). In other words, PCP studies 
explore the challenges customers of bespoke product-service solutions face (Caldwell et al., 
2009). PCP is defined as “inter-organizational arrangements that are characterized by 
significant levels of performance complexity (i.e. must include numerous knowledge 
intensive activities) and infrastructural complexity (i.e. must include substantial bespoke or 
highly customized hardware and software elements)” (Lewis and Roehrich, 2009, p.128). 
PCP investigates the inherent challenges and complexities of managing operations in 
environments that have complex infrastructural and performance requirements (Caldwell and 
Howard, 2014). At the heart of PCP is the notion of adapting to the dynamics of emergent 
customer requirements particularly across capital intensive sectors such as construction, 
healthcare, aerospace and defense (Hartmann et al., 2014; Roehrich and Lewis, 2014). 
Complex performance implies the bundling of product and infrastructure with long-term, 
often multi decade service support requirements, a combination which produces a number of 
significant decisions, for instance, through-life asset management, product upgrade strategies, 
cost and risk modelling, new forms of contractual control and adoption of new business 
models. 
Contracting capabilities and associated mechanisms are inherently important for 
managing complex performance of integrated products-services or solutions (Kreye et al., 
2015; Spring and Araujo, 2014). A pocket of IM and OSM studies, albeit relatively limited in 
number, stresses the role of PBCs for designing and managing exchange relationships 
oriented towards performance outcomes (e.g. Caldwell and Howard, 2014). In brief, this 
literature emphasizes the need to clearly specify performance in terms of outcomes and end 
customer value (Datta and Roy, 2011). The achievement of key performance indicators 
9 
 
(KPIs) is tied to the payment mechanism so as to align supplier incentives to those of the 
buyer, and various approaches to incentive systems design have been examined in the 
literature (e.g. Glas et al., 2013). Incentive alignment appears to be more problematic at the 
supply chain level and extant literature specifically reports on challenges of deploying PBCs 
in the service provider’s supplier relationships, focusing on issues such as information 
asymmetries, lack of information sharing, and inability to transfer risk to sub-suppliers (e.g. 
Selviaridis and Norrman, 2014; Kleeman and Essig, 2013). 
 
2.2.A snapshot of PBC research across disciplines 
On the basis of the discussion of the relationship between PBC and the IM and OSM 
literatures that address relevant concepts (e.g. solutions and PCP), this section outlines PBC 
research in a broader context. Specifically, it discusses PBC research in contexts beyond the 
narrow scope of business studies (e.g. health, public administration, transportation, energy 
and environmental studies) and develops an overarching framework of PBC research.  
In terms of theoretical perspectives underpinning PBC research, a recent review by 
Selviaridis and Wynstra (2015) suggests that PBC studies employ mostly contract theories 
emphasizing extrinsic, economic incentives and contract design issues to combat potential 
opportunistic behavior. This certainty comes as no surprise given the inherent emphasis of 
PBC on incentivizing supplier performance attainment and improvement. Agency theory 
appears to be frequently employed to tackle performance specification and risk sharing 
aspects of PBC deals (Datta and Roy, 2011; Kim et al., 2007). Transaction cost economics 
has also been applied along with property rights and management control perspectives, 
though to a lesser extent, to examine issues such as asset ownership and investment 
incentives (e.g. Bertone and Meesen, 2013; Hooper, 2008). As a complement to the above 
theories, an information economics perspective has also been employed to empirically 
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examine information asymmetries in relation to the adoption of PBC in successive buyer-
supplier dyads in supply chains (e.g. Kleemann and Essig, 2013).  
It should be noted, however, that a large body of cross-disciplinary PBC research 
remains under-theorized as many studies in domains such as health and transportation 
engineering appear to focus on practical implementation aspects and overall a striking lack of 
theories exist in PBC research (142 out of 241 analyzed contributions, or approximately 60%, 
do not mention a theory at all) (Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015). This reflects a more generic 
gap in existing PBC research, which appears to lack a sound theoretical or conceptual 
grounding (referred to as Gap A). As an example, the extant literature has yet to establish a 
strong theory-based explanation of how performance-based incentives instigate innovation in 
service design and delivery. Future studies may want to adopt theories that go beyond often 
used theoretical perspectives and explore, for instance, the behavioral aspects of individual 
contract managers using PBC.  
However, Gap A does not imply that PBC research already reached a high maturity in 
empirical research. PBC research collectively employs a variety of methods and Selviaridis 
and Wynstra (2015) report that both quantitative and qualitative methods have been adopted, 
including mainly mathematical modelling and case-based research. Mixed method designs, 
literature reviews and qualitative interview studies also feature in the extant literature (e.g. 
Guo and Ng, 2011; Gransberg, 2010; Hypko et al., 2010). It is however surprising that 
survey, experimental or simulation research designs have been much less frequently used 
given their relevance to examining issues such as risk preferences and behavioral responses 
to incentive payments (e.g. Maile and Collins, 2012; Meezan and McBeath, 2008). It is 
suggested that the use of these empirical methods opens up several opportunities for PBC 
scholars that would be worth exploring (e.g. more reliance on survey or experimental 
evidence). However PBC research is already empirical in nature (Selviaridis and Wynstra, 
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2015) and hence the limited use of certain research methods (e.g. experiments) cannot qualify 
as a research gap in a broad sense. 
Next, existing research refers to various analytical levels. Overall, the cross-
disciplinary PBC literature can be classified in terms of the three main levels of analysis: the 
firm (which also includes the level of individual managers within organizations), the (buyer-
supplier) dyad, and the supply chain/network level. The latter also includes studies of 
outcome-based contract design and management in service triads of buyers, suppliers and end 
customers (Wynstra et al., 2015). However, PBC research concerning healthcare and social 
welfare services appears to have only implicitly considered the perspective of the end 
customer/patient in relation to incentive mechanism design (e.g. Lu and Donaldson, 2000). 
Research at the firm level can either take a buyer or a service provider perspective although it 
seems that the majority of studies refer to the buyer-supplier dyad as its primary unit of 
analysis (Selviaridis, 2011). This is why firm-level (buyer or supplier) research on PBC (Gap 
B) as well as triadic and network analyses of the phenomenon (Gap C) bear a high potential 
for future research. For instance, the extant PBC literature has yet to examine whether there 
are any links between extrinsic financial incentives that are included in the contract, and 
those offered to employees within the supplier firm. In a similar vein, existing research has 
underplayed the interactions between extrinsic ‘pay for performance’ incentives and intrinsic 
ones of supplier employees (e.g. identification with a common purpose and autonomy of 
action), and their effects on performance improvement and customer satisfaction. 
In addition to employing different analytical levels, extant literature also appears to 
stress a conceptualization of PBC as a process comprising distinct stages i.e. adoption and 
design of outcome-based contracts, PBC execution and ongoing management and PBC 
finalization which considers all activities and processes related to re-tendering and/or re-
designing contracts after the end of the exchange, or to the dissolution of contractual 
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relationships (e.g. Selviaridis and Norrman, 2015; Behn and Kant, 1999). Admittedly, such a 
PBC process perspective differs very little from more generic contract design and 
management activities emphasized in the broader contracting literature (e.g. Lumineau et al., 
2011; Argyres and Mayer, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989). Overall, the PBC literature appears to 
have focused mainly on the design and implementation of PBC e.g. factors influencing the 
design of contracts, barriers of implementation, and the process steps to implement a PBC. 
Existing research appears to have put less emphasis on how PBCs are actually managed and 
re-designed or adapted over time to allow for changing requirements and environmental 
circumstances, and how termination of PBCs is managed to facilitate the dissolution of 
buyer-supplier relationships or facilitate the transition to another service provider. The above 
issues in relation to the execution and finalization phases of PBC are identified as another 
major area for future research (Gap D). 
Taken together, the four research gaps could be structured according to the 
contracting process stages, namely initiation, execution and finalization. Although these 
phases might be named differently in the literature (see van Weele, 2005; van der Valk and 
Rozemeijer, 2009), relationship and contractual phases can be subsumed in these main three 
phases (e.g. Zheng et al., 2008; Essig and Batran, 2005). 
Another classification criterion we employ is the perspective taken by the researchers 
while analyzing PBC. The various perspectives of the involved parties are (i) firm level 
(which also incorporates the perspective of individual managers), either on the buyer or seller 
side; (ii) dyadic perspective, considering the buyer-seller relationship; (iii) triadic/network 
perspective, referring to a business network of at least three involved entities. Together with 
the basic understanding of PBC (emphasis on outcomes and incentives), the contracting 
process and the perspectives form a framework against which the identified research gaps are 
mapped (Figure 2). 
13 
 
 
Fig. 2. Broad knowledge gaps in PBC research 
 
3. Focus of the special issue articles  
Following the review of PBC (-related) literature, this section sheds light on the specific 
contributions that feature in this SI and their focus and key arguments. The following sections 
provide a brief summary of these papers. Each article offers a different focus on PBC such as 
focusing on incentives, outcomes, or performance challenges. In addition, the articles adopt 
different levels of analysis; three articles adopt a dyadic perspective and two a triadic one. 
Three of the five SI articles analyze topics in the area of PBC initiation and agreement, while 
the remaining two address PBC execution. The papers are presented in the following order – 
first papers adopting a dyadic perspective, then papers addressing a network/triadic level. The 
papers are additionally ranked in terms of the stage of the PBC process they are related to 
(see Figure 3). 
14 
 
 
Fig. 3. Systematization of the SI articles according to the PBC research framework 
 
Regien Sumo, Wendy van der Valk, Arjan van Weele, and Geert Duysters contribute 
to the understanding of how PBC supports supplier-led innovation with their paper titled 
“Performance-based contracts to foster Innovation in outsourced service delivery” (Paper No. 
1). That paper explores two cases of IT outsourcing via PBC and suggests that a high-degree 
of outcome-orientation gives the required autonomy to the supplier which allows the 
implementation of innovation in the execution of the service delivery, while incentives 
(rewards linked to performance) provide the motivation to do so. The paper explores the 
importance of the construct of granted autonomy which contributes to the wider PBC topic of 
the alignment of interests to improve performance via innovation. The paper provides 
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implications for PBC agreement (contract design, contract philosophy) and how business 
partners in a PBC relationship should collaborate. 
Another paper which analyzes the roles of the buying firm in PBC is entitled 
“Outcome Attributability in Performance-based Contracting: Roles and Activities of the 
Buying Organization” and is authored by Fabian Nullmeier, Finn Wynstra, and Erik van 
Raaij (Paper No. 2). The paper suggests that buying firms have an important part to play in 
co-producing service outcomes. Outcome uncertainty is introduced insofar as outcomes are 
only partly a function of supplier effort and inputs. This paper explores the construct of 
“outcome attributability” by investigating two case studies (a train operator and a university 
hospital) and interviewing personnel at both the buying and supplying organizations. Roles 
and contractual activities are assessed in both cases and lead to a conceptual model which 
contributes to the understanding of which external factors, buyer roles, and buyer engagement 
in monitoring and coordination, impacts on outcome attributability. 
Johanna Liinamaa, Mika Viljanen, Anna Hurmerinta, Hanna Luotola, Maria Ivanova-
Gongne, and Magnus Gustafsson take a different perspective for their paper entitled 
“Performance-based and functional contracting in value –based solution selling” into 
account, as their work links PBC to marketing literature (Paper No. 3). Their comprehensive 
work is based on a 14-month research project, observations from 144 meetings and 
workshops, and the analysis of multiple data including >800 e-mail correspondences between 
the different stakeholder groups involved in the project. Their findings support the 
identification of implementation barriers, including legal-technical contract design issues. 
Outcome-orientation of PBC (functional contracting) is seen as an appropriate solution to 
overcome the barriers arising from deficient pre-contractual integration. The paper’s main 
contribution is a process model that proposes an appropriate pricing and selling strategy 
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procedure (e.g. including Memorandum of Understandings) which could be used to overcome 
implementation barriers in the collaboration process in the PBC relationship. 
While the previous papers adopt a dyadic perspective, Stefanos Mouzas’s paper 
entitled “Performance-based contracting in long-term supply relationships” investigates how 
firms and their supply chains agree upon performance targets and the incentive and 
compensation mechanisms (Paper No. 4). For this purpose, the research applied a qualitative 
approach analyzing six cases with interviews of 83 key individuals, from board members to 
logistics specialists. Together the cases form a supply relationship network between two 
service providers, two manufacturers, and two retailer companies, which is used to analyze 
how “genuine consent” about performance targets and incentives is emerging in a PBC.  
Finally, the paper by Mickey Howard, Zhaohui Wu, Nigel Caldwell, Fu Jia, and 
Christian König offers in-depth insights into the dynamics of PBC in the defense industry in 
their paper entitled “Performance-based Contracting in the Defense Industry: Exploring 
Triadic Dynamics between Government, OEMs and Suppliers” (Paper No. 5). This study 
adopts a longitudinal perspective and describes and analyzes a 30-year timeframe of a 
business relationship in the defense industry. The paper provides a triadic perspective and 
analyzes the dynamics in the principal-agent roles over time, while executing the contract(s). 
The longitudinal study suggests that the design of incentive systems should also consider 
long-term and less direct financial measures, such as the market share of the supplier. It also 
argues that outcome-orientation must be elaborated to develop a more nuanced understanding 
of PBC that goes beyond a simple focus on transferring risks. Another important contribution 
is the identification of a sequential gauden and iungen strategy over time, which is explained 
in detail in their paper. 
 
4. Discussion: Remaining PBC research gaps and future research avenues 
17 
 
Overall, the five contributions of this SI clearly address incentive price mechanisms 
and outcome performance. Two papers address strategies and consent building to overcome 
implementation barriers to PBC. Stefanos Mouzas’s paper places a stronger focus on consent 
about performance targets, while the paper by Johanna Liinamaa and colleagues provides a 
comprehensive analysis of value-based outcomes and pricing (incentive) mechanisms. The 
above suggest that all papers fit into the PBC quadrant of our performance-incentive matrix 
(Figure 1). 
Considering the use of theories and the empirical methods, all papers in the SI are 
based on case study research. Although the five contributions analyze a large amount of 
interviews and other primary and secondary data sources, some of which stretch over a long 
time period, the papers’ core is qualitative in nature. This is partly in line with the findings 
from a recent literature review on PBC, which found that case studies are one of the most 
prominent research methods in PBC research besides mathematical modelling (Selviaridis 
and Wynstra, 2015). Quantitative empirical research including surveys and field experiments 
are less frequently used in PBC studies. This is a bit surprising given the potential of 
experimental designs to address behavioral aspects (e.g. information processing capacity and 
risk attitude of individual managers) relevant to inter-firm contracting (e.g. see Weber and 
Mayer, 2011). Regarding theoretical perspectives, the papers are grounded on key theories 
such as agency theory and management control theory. That means that these papers 
contribute towards closing the identified research Gap A. However, there is still a need for 
further quantitative, theory-testing work on the PBC phenomenon. 
Considering the adopted perspectives, three papers focus on the buyer-supplier dyad, 
one paper analyzes triadic relationships (Howard et al.) and one paper (Mouzas) takes a 
network perspective. This corresponds partly to the findings from the literature review, as 
PBC is often analyzed considering both sides of the dyad the buyer and the provider 
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(Selviaridis, 2011). The majority of research on service supply chain relationships is based on 
a dyadic perspective (Selviaridis and Norrman, 2014). Therefore, it would come as no 
surprise to recommend that future research puts more emphasis on firm-level studies (Gap B). 
On the other hand, two papers adopted a triadic or network perspective clearly addressing 
Gap C, even if it is agreed that several questions still remain open. Prospective fields of 
interest remain e.g. in improving the understanding of how PBC links to the buying firm’s 
supply strategy. One could argue that there is not actually “one” (functional) purchasing 
strategy, instead strategies are formulated on the category level (Hesping and Schiele, 2015). 
Nevertheless, PBC can serve both as a means of buying a solution as discussed in section 2.1, 
or as a preferred buying strategy – in any case, the design and implementation of PBC needs 
to be aligned with a company’s strategic sourcing drivers.  
From a supplier’s perspective, future research should empirically examine how the 
extrinsic financial incentives offered at the supplier firm translate into financial or non-
financial incentives for employees within the firm to motivate them to contribute to customer 
performance improvement. Such research should also study the interplay of pay for 
performance incentives with any intrinsic motivations of employees (e.g. Fehr and Falk, 
2002) in order to develop a more nuanced understanding of the potential of PBC to motivate 
supplier-led performance improvements and innovation.  
Lastly, many contributions in the literature deal with the process phases of PBC 
initiation, PBC contract agreement, and PBC execution, while the finalization and 
termination of a PBC relationship is rarely addressed (e.g. Levin, 2003). Even if the end of a 
PBC relationship is mentioned in the literature, this is often not in the context of how to 
further develop the relationship, but, for instance, that the possibility of contract termination 
is another incentive method (e.g. Hensher and Stanley, 2008). In this SI, two papers adopted a 
longitudinal approach which contributes to an analysis of the PBC phenomenon across the 
19 
 
stages of the contracting process. Nonetheless, the question whether a PBC contract should 
be prolonged, adapted (or even changed to another contract type) has been largely 
underplayed in the literature. PBC is not a new topic, but a scientific interest has re-surfaced 
during the last decade and empirical research in this areas is still growing. That might be a 
reason why the literature focuses on the implementation and execution problems, rather than 
thinking holistically and addressing the PBC finalization phase (see Gap D). Future research 
should empirically examine how the termination of PBC is managed in practice, and whether 
the threat of termination can be used as a means to incentivize changes in behaviors for both 
provider and buyer. In addition, further empirical research is needed to examine how the 
design of performance-based contracts and associated incentive systems evolves in the 
context of long-term relationships to reflect exchange- and partner-specific learning (e.g. 
Mayer and Argyres, 2004). A longitudinal approach would be most appropriate to research 
such dynamics. 
 
5. Conclusion  
This paper presents the state-of-the-art of PBC research and positions the 
contributions of the five papers forming this SI. The review also highlights remaining 
research gaps within four major areas and provides specific suggestions for further research 
avenues to address these gaps. PBC research at the dyadic level is far more prevalent than on 
a firm level (including research at the level of individual managers) or triadic/network level. 
This SI on performance-based contracting contributes towards addressing these gaps and 
advances our understanding of PBC in business markets and its multiple roles such as 
aligning incentives among supply chain partners and fostering innovation.  
Nevertheless, especially PBC in business markets together with the wider economic 
trend towards “use not own” are interesting future research areas. In the introduction we 
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highlighted that business markets develop from “buying” to “using”, resulting in a transition 
from “one time payments” to “subscription” payments – e.g. monthly payments for car 
sharing / mobility service instead of buying a car. As a result, a fixed cost approach is 
becoming less viable for OEMs – and they have to find ways of how to share their 
employment risk with their suppliers. The PBC approach is one solution to transfer the “pay 
per use” business model adopted in B2C markets to B2B markets.  
Overall, PBC research is at an exciting stage of its development, having over the last 
decade or so increased in maturity and established itself as an important field of study for IM 
and OSM scholars and practitioners alike. PBC research now needs to push its theoretical and 
methodological frontiers as outlined by the research gaps identified in this paper. We very 
much hope that this SI will serve as a basis for further research developments to help build a 
more generic theory of PBC.   
21 
 
References  
Argyres, N., & Mayer, K. (2007). Contract design as a firm capability: An integration of 
learning and transaction cost perspectives. Academy of Management Review, 32 (4), 1060-
1077.  
Axelsson, B. & Wynstra, F. (2002). Buying Business Services. Chichester: Wiley. 
Azimont, F., Cova, B., & Salle, R. (1998). Solution selling and project marketing: a 
convergence towards customer intimacy for joint construction of offer and demand. 
Communication at the 14th IMP Annual Conference, Turku, Finland September 1998, 
Proceedings, Vol. 1, 113-132.  
Behn, R. & Kant, P. (1999). Strategies for avoiding the pitfalls of performance contracting." 
Public Productivity and Management Review, 22 (4), 470-489. 
Bertone, M. P. & Meessen, B. (2013). Studying the link between institutions and health 
system performance: a framework and an illustration with the analysis of two 
performance-based financing schemes in Burundi." Health Policy and Planning, 28 (8), 
847-857. 
Brucker, D. L. & Stewart, M. (2011). Performance-based contracting within a state substance 
abuse treatment system: A preliminary exploration of differences in client access and 
client outcomes. Journal of Behavioral Health Services and Research, 38 (3), 1-15. 
Brax, S.A. & Visintin, F. (2016). Meta-model of servitization: The integrative profiling 
approach, Industrial Marketing Management, In press. 
Caldwell, N.D. & Howard, M. (2010). Procuring Complex Performance: Studies of 
Innovation in Product Service Management, Routledge: New York, NY. 
Caldwell, N. & Howard, M. (2014). Contracting for complex performance in markets of few 
buyers and sellers", International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 
34 Iss 2 pp. 270 – 294. 
Caldwell, N.D., Roehrich, J.K. & Davies, A.C. (2009). Procuring complex performance in 
construction: London Heathrow Terminal 5 and a Private Finance Initiative hospital. 
Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management, 15, 178-186. 
Cornet, E., Katz, R., Molloy, R., Schaedler, J., Sharma, D., & Tipping, A. (2000). Customer 
solutions: from pilots to profits. Booz, Allen & Hamilton Viewpoint, 1-16. 
Cova, B., & Salle, R. (2007). Introduction to the IMM special issue on ‘project marketing and 
the marketing of solutions’; a comprehensive approach to project marketing and the 
marketing of solutions. Industrial Marketing Management, 36 (2), 138-146.  
22 
 
Datta, P.P. & Roy, R. (2011). Operations strategy for the effective delivery of integrated 
industrial product-service offerings: Two exploratory defense industry case studies. 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 31 (5), 579-603. 
Davies, A. (2004). Moving base into high-value integrated solutions: a value stream 
approach. Industrial and Corporate Change, 13 (5), 727-756. 
Davies, A., Brady, T., & Hobday, M. (2006). Charting a path toward integrated solutions. 
Sloan Management Review, 47, 39-48.  
Earley, K. (2016). Access over ownership is the future of consumption. Retrieved from 
www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/access-over-ownership-future-consumption. 
Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management 
Review, 14 (1), 57-74.  
Essig, M., & Batran, A. (2005). Public–private partnership—Development of long-term 
relationships in public procurement in Germany. Journal of Purchasing & Supply 
Management, 11 (5-6), 221-231. 
Fehr, E. & Falk, A. (2002). Psychological foundations of incentives. European Economic 
Review, 46, 687-724. 
Galbraith, J.R. (2002). Organizing to deliver solutions. Organizational Dynamics, 31 (2), 
194-207. 
Glas, A., E. Hofmann & Essig, M. (2013). Performance-based logistics: A portfolio for 
contracting military supply. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics 
Management, 43 (2), 97-115. 
Gransberg, D. D. (2010). Framework for performance-based contractor prequalification. 
Transportation Research Record, 2151, 46-54. 
Guo, L. & Ng, I. (2011). The co-production of equipment-based services: An interpersonal 
approach. European Management Journal, 29 (1), 43-50. 
Hartmann, A.; Roehrich, J.K.; Frederiksen, L. & Davies, A. (2014). Procuring complex 
performance: the transition process in public infrastructure. International Journal of 
Operations & Production Management, 32 (2), 174-194.  
Hensher, D. A. & Stanley, J. (2008). Transacting under a performance-based contract: The 
role of negotiation and competitive tendering. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and 
Practice, 42 (9), 1143-1151. 
Hesping, F. H., & Schiele, H. (2015). Purchasing strategy development: A multi-level review. 
Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management, 21 (2), 138-150. 
23 
 
Hobday, M. (2000). The project-based organization: an ideal form for managing complex 
product systems. Research Policy, 29 (7), 871–893.  
Holmbom, M., Bergquist, B., & Vanhatalo, E. (2014). Performance-based logistics – an 
illusive panacea or a concept for the future? Journal of Manufacturing Technology 
Management, 25(7), 958–979.  
Hooper, L. (2008). Paying for performance: Uncertainty, asymmetric information and the 
payment model. Research in Transport Economics, 22 (1), 157-163. 
Hypko, P., Tilebein, M. & Gleich, R. (2010). Clarifying the concept of performance-based 
contracting in manufacturing industries: A research synthesis." Journal of Service 
Management, 21 (5), 625-655. 
Kapletia, D., & Probert, D. (2009). Migrating from products to solutions: an exploration of 
system support in the UK defense industry. Industrial Marketing Management, 39 (4), 
582-592. 
Kim, S. H., Cohen, M. A. & Netessine, S. (2007). Performance contracting in after-sales 
service supply chains. Management Science, 53 (12), 1843-1858. 
Kim, S. H., Cohen, M. A., Netessine, S. & Veeraraghavan, S. (2010). Contracting for 
infrequent restoration and recovery of mission-critical systems. Management Science, 56 
(9), 1551-1567. 
Kleemann, F. C. & Essig, M. (2013). A providers' perspective on supplier relationships in 
performance-based contracting. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 19 (3), 
185-198. 
Kreye, M.; Roehrich, J. K. & Lewis, M.A. (2015). Servitizing manufacturers: The importance 
of service complexity and contractual and relational capabilities. Production Planning & 
Control, 26 (14-15), 1233-1246. 
Levin, J. (2003). Relational incentive contracts. The American Economic Review, 93 (3), 
835–857. 
Lewis, M.A., & Roehrich, J.K. (2009). Contracts, relationships and integration: towards a 
model of the procurement of complex performance. International Journal of Procurement 
Management, 2 (2), 125-142. 
Lumineau, F., Frechet, M. & Puthod, D. (2011). An organizational learning perspective on 
the contracting process. Strategic Organization, 9 (1), 8-32.  
Malhotra, A. & Van Alstyne, M. (2014). The dark side of the sharing economy… and how to 
lighten it. Communications of the ACM 57 (11), 24-27. 
24 
 
Maille, P. & Collins, A. R. (2012). An index approach to performance-based payments for 
water quality. Journal of Environmental Management, 99, 27-35. 
Martin, L. L. (2007). Performance-based contracting for human services: A proposed model. 
Public Administration Quarterly, 31 (2), 130-151. 
Mattson, L-G. (1973). Systems selling as a strategy on industrial markets. Industrial 
Marketing Management, 3, 107-120. 
Mayer, K., & Argyres. N. (2004). Learning to contract: Evidence from the personal computer 
industry. Organization Science, 15 (4), 394-410. 
Meezan, W. & McBeath, B. (2008). Market-based disparities in foster care outcomes. 
Children and Youth Services Review, 30 (4), 388-406. 
Ng., I.C.L., Maull, R., & Yip, N. (2009). Outcome-based contracts as a driver for systems 
thinking and service-dominant logic in service science: Evidence from the defence 
industry, European Management Journal, 27 (6), 377-387. 
Page, A.L., & Siemplenski, M. (1983). Product systems marketing. Industrial Marketing 
Management, (12), 89-99. 
Pawar. K.S., Beltagui, A., & Riedel, J. C.K.H. (2009). The PSO triangle: designing product, 
service and organisation to create value. International Journal of Operations & 
Production Management, 29 (5), 468-493. 
Payne, A.F., Storbacka, K., & Frow, P. (2008). Managing the co-creation of value. Journal of 
the Academy of Marketing Science, 36, 83-96.  
Prahalad, C.K., & Ramaswamy, V. (2004). Co-creating unique value with customers. 
Strategy & Leadership, 32(3), 4-9. 
Prencipe, A., Davies, A., & Hobday, M. (2003). The business of systems integration. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Randall, W. S., Pohlen, T. L., & Hanna, J. B. (2010). Evolving a theory of performance based 
contracting using insights from servcie dominant logic. Journal of Business Logistics 31 
(2), 35–62. 
Randall, W. S., Wittmann, C. M., Nowicki, D. R., & Pohlen, T. L. (2014). Service-dominant 
logic and supply chain management: Are we there yet? International Journal of Physical 
Distribution & Logistics Management, 44 (1/2), 113–131. 
Roehrich, J.K. & Lewis, M.A. (2014). Procuring complex performance: Implications for 
exchange governance complexity. International Journal of Operations & Production 
Management, 32 (2), 221-241.  
25 
 
Sawhney, M., Balasubramanian, S., & Krishnan, V.V. (2004). Creating growth with services. 
MIT Sloan Management Review, 45 (2), 34-43.  
Seedhouse, E. (2013). SpaceX: Making commercial spaceflight a reality, New York, Springer 
Science & Business Media. 
Selviaridis, K. (2011). Performance based contracting: State of the art and future directions. 
In Rozemeijer, F., Wetzels, M. and Quintens, L.  (Eds.) Proceedings of the 20
th
 Annual 
IPSERA Conference: 20/20 Vision: Preparing Today for Tomorrow’s Challenges, 10-13 
April 2011, Maastricht, Netherlands, 514-534.   
Selviaridis, K., & Norrman, A. (2015). Performance-based contracting for advanced logistics 
services: Challenges in its adoption, design and management. International Journal of 
Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 45 (6), 592 – 617. 
Selviaridis, K., & Norrman, A. (2014). Performance-based contracting in service supply 
chains: a service provider risk perspective. Supply Chain Management: An International 
Journal, 19 (2), 153–172.  
Selviaridis, K., & Wynstra, F. (2015). Performance-based contracting: a literature review and 
future research directions. International Journal of Production Research, 53 (12), 3505–
3540.  
Spring, M. & Araujo, L. (2014). Indirect capabilities and complex performance. International 
Journal of Operations & Production Management, 34 (2), 150 – 173. 
Tuli, K.R., Kohli, A.K., & Bharadwaj, S.G. (2007). Rethinking customer solutions: from 
product bundles to relational processes. Journal of Marketing, 71, 1–17. 
van der Valk, W. & Rozemeijer, F. (2009). Buying business services: towards a structured 
service purchasing process. Journal of Services Marketing, 23 (1) 3–10 
Vandermerwe, S., & Rada, J. (1988). Servitization of business: adding value by adding 
services. European Management Journal, 6 (4), 314-324.  
van Weele, A. J. (2014). Purchasing and Supply Chain Management - Analysis, Strategy, 
Planning and Practice, 6
th
 Ed., Andover, Cengage Learning. 
Vargo, S., & Lusch, R. (2004). Evolving to a new dominant logic for marketing. Journal of 
Marketing, 68, 1–17.  
Weber, L. & Mayer, K. J. (2011). Designing effective contracts: Exploring the influence of 
framing and expectations. Academy of Management Review, 36 (1), pp. 53-75. 
Wynstra, F., Spring, M., & Schoenherr, T. (2015). Service triads: A research agenda for 
buyer-supplier-customer triads in business services. Journal of Operations Management, 
35, 1-20. 
26 
 
Zheng, J., Roehrich, J. K., & Lewis, M. (2008). The dynamics of contractual and relational 
governance: Evidence from long-term public–private procurement arrangements. Journal 
of Purchasing & Supply Management, 14 (1), 43-54. 
